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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8879 
Respondents disagree with appellant's statement of 
facts in such a large measure that a separate statement 
followed by specific references to those statements of 
appellant wherein respondents disagree will be made. 
This in an action to have a trust imposed on certain 
mining property and for an accounting for the proceeds 
therefrom. The case turns upon the intent and effect of 
certain quitclaim mining deeds given to defendant by 
plaintiffs in June of 1952. However, in order to under-
stand and interpret these deeds an understanding of the 
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background and events leading up to these deeds is im-
perative. 
Defendant is the brother of each of the plaintiffs and 
all are heirs of A. L. Tomlinson, who died in 1941 (R. 2, 
23). At the time of his death, A. L. Tomlinson was the 
owner of some unpatented mining claims in the Temple 
Mountain District of Emery County, Utah, known as the 
Camp Bird Mining claims Nos. 1 to 14. 
At the time of Mr. Tomlinson's death, a quiet title 
action was pending in the District Court of Emery Coun-
ty, Civil No. 1466, the Court records of which are a part 
of the record on appeal. This record discloses that al-
though prior to his death A. L. Tomlinson ·was not a 
party to the action, following his death F. B. Hammond 
purporting to represent Mr. Tomlinson entered into a 
stipulation whereby decedent was to receive an undivided 
71;2% interest in a group of mining claims involved ]n 
that action. The Camp Bird claims were not mentioned 
anywhere in the files of case ~ o. 1466. The stipulation 
was entered into in l\fay of 1942, some six months after 
Mr. Tomlinson's death and was therefore of questionable 
validity. A judgment on this stipulation was not entered 
until April of 1950, almost eight years later. It appears 
from the testimony that neither the plaintiffs nor the 
defendant lmew of this stipulation at the time it was 
entered. In 1950 defendant learned of it frmn E. G. Fraw-
ley, president of oContinental Mining and l\filling Com-
pany with whom defendant was dealing (T-1, p. 257). 
Plaintiffs did not learn of the stipulation at tl1at time 
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(T-1, p. 37; T-1, p .. 60; T-1, p. 96; T-1, p.105; T-1, p.128; 
T-1, p. 140). 
On July 6, 1942, probate proceedings of the 
Estate of A. L. Tomlinson were commenced. The first 
administrator had done nothing with the estate whatso-
ever, and in 1949 he resigned and defendant was ap-
pointed on April 6, 1949. (D's Exh. 18) 
Nothing of any consequence had occurred on the 
property between 1942 and 1949, when uranium activity 
got under way. In June of 1949, a group known as the 
Hanson group, claiming ownership of some claims on 
Temple Mountain, commenced a quiet title action, Civil 
No. 1713, against all parties claiming any interest in 
claims on Temple Mountain, including defendant as ad-
ministrator of the Tomlinson estate. The Court files of 
Civil No. 1713 are included as a part of the record on 
appeal in this case. 
In the meantime, defendant had taken possession of 
the Camp Bird claims, had shipped certain ores there-
from and in the fall of 1949 entered into several leases 
for the mining of these claims (D's Exh. 11, 12, 13; T-2, 
p. 25,80). The court found that from these leases defend-
ant received and deposited in bank accounts for the es-
tate the sum of $7,329.71. The Court further found that 
the royalties which accrued under these leases and from 
the mining of Continental Mining and Milling Company, 
as hereafter described, during 1949 and part of 1950 
amounted to $13,603.64. Defendant did not attempt to 
verify the amount of royalties which were due under these 
shipments, nor did he take any steps to obtain an ac-
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counting from the persons shipping the ores, or do any-
thing to collect these additional royalties (Finding No. 
10, R. 80). 
In addition to the royalties received, defendant ob-
tained money and property amounting to $335.00 from 
two of the lessees, which he did not deposit in the estate 
accounts (T-1, p. 305; T-2, pgs. 63, 66). 
In January of 1950 defendant was contacted by E. 
G. Frawley who was interested in acquiring the Camp 
Bird claims. He entered into a contract for the sale of 
the claims for a purchase price of $25,000.00 and at least 
65,000 shares of the common stock of a corporation to 
which Mr. Frawley was transfering the contract. This 
agreement also provided that :\Ir. Frawley would pay 
all expenses then due or thereafter to become due in con-
nection with the Tomlinson estate and would prosecute 
such actions as might be necessary to clear the title to 
the ·Camp Bird claims. The agreement provided defend-
ant would obtain quitclaim deeds from the other heirs 
of A. L. Tomlinson. ( Exh. A of P's Exh. 0). 
In furtherance of this agreement, on January ~3. 
1950, defendant wrote a letter to each of plaintiffs re-
questing that they execute a deed of the Camp Bird 
claims to him, authorize hi1n to discharge F. B. IImnmond 
as attorney for the estate and to en1plo~- counsel to pro-
secute any legal actions which Inight be necessary to pro-
tect the property. The letter expressly stated that he 
would hold the clailns for plaintiffs' use and benefit and 
would account to then1 for all n1onies and stock received 
therefrom. It further provided that the~· ,,·ould not be 
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charged for any expenses, past or future, in connection 
with the legal work mentioned. The letter advised them 
he was going to sell the claims and was to receive 56,000 
[sic] shares of stock from Continental Mining and Milling 
Company (P's Exh. C). 
In response to defendant's request, plaintiffs execut-
ed quitclaim deeds conveying the Camp Bird claims to 
defendant. Defendant admitted that he received the 
claims under these deeds upon an express trust to hold 
the mining claims for the use and benefit of plaintiffs 
(T-1, p. 2; T-1, p. 3; T-1, p. 4; T-1, p. 5). 
The contract of sale was assigned to Continental 
Mining and Milling Company who assumed the obligation 
thereof (P's Exh. H). On March 18, 1950, Mr. Frawley on 
behalf of the company agreed to pay defendant a royalty 
of 10% on ores produced by the company until defendant 
had received $5,000, and the 65,000 shares of the com-
pany's stock (Exh. B of P's. Exh. 0). 
In the spring of 1950, Mr. Frawley organized Con-
solidated Uranium Mines, Inc. (T-2, p. 203), an affiliate 
and successor in interest to Continental, in both of which 
Mr. Frawley was the president and C. Allen Elggren was 
secretary (T-2, p. 63). On May 16, 1950, Consolidated 
entered into a lease of the Temple Mountain properties 
with all of the parties to the quiet title action with the 
exception of defendant and a group of claimants who will 
be designated the Migliaccio group. This lease is con-
tained in the record of Civil No. 1713. It provided that 
Consolidated would mine the properties and would place 
a royalty of 10% in escrow in a bank to be paid out ac-
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cording to the final determination of Civil No. 1713. 
Having joined hands with defendant's adversaries 
by this lease, a suit was then started by Continental 
against defendant in June of 1950, claiming fraud on de-
fendant's part in the January 1950 contract of sale (P's. 
Exh. H). Defendant filed no answer to this complaint 
(T-1, p. 304). Rather he entered into an agreement in 
July of 1950 with Continental terminating his prior 
agreements with them and giving Continental an option 
to purchase the ·Camp Bird claims for the cash and stock 
previously agreed to be paid. In this agreement, Contin-
ental agreed to pay all of defendant's legal expenses and 
claims against the estate for legal work, and also agreed 
to hold defendant harmless for any claims arising out of 
ores removed from the Camp Bird claims prior to May 
16, 1950 (P's. Exh. 0). 
On December 19, 1950, Continental authorized the 
issuance to defendant of 32,500 shares of the stock of 
Consolidated held in its treasury (P's. Exh. Y). Coin-
cident with this, defendant executed a document whereby 
he recognized that he claimed only a five per cent interest 
in the Temple :Mountain clailns pursuant to the stipula-
tion in Civil No. 1466, and thereby relinquished his claim 
to ownership of the Camp Bird claims. This document 
was executed January 12, 1951 (P's Exh. R), but de-
fendant had agreed to it earlier (T-2. p.125). Continental 
dismissed its suit against defendant on January 15, 
1951 (P's Exh I). 
From 1\fay, 1950 to Decmnber, 1950, defendant held 
a sublease of the Camp Bird No. 12 mining claim from 
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Continental and produced ores therefrom (T-1, p. 308; 
T-2, p. 61-3). The Court found that he received $23,804.40 
from this production and incurred expenses of $17,244.17 
in connection therewith (Finding No. 29, R. 84). 
The quiet title action, Civil No. 1713, continued 
along without going to trial in 1951. Then, on December 
15, 1951, a stipulation and agreement resolving all ad-
verse claims between the parties except the Migliaccio 
group was entered into. This agreement provided un-
divided interests in various claims, and gave defendant 
as administrator of the Tomlinson Estate an undivided 
3.53% interest in these claims which covered all of Tem-
ple Mountain. It provided that the royalty monies which 
had been placed in escrow from Consolidated's operation 
should be disbursed with the exception of 5% thereof 
to be held for the Migliaccio group, and it waived any 
claims accounting for ores theretofore removed by the 
parties (P's Exh. F). The evidence of defendant was that 
although the agreement was agreed to in December of 
1951, it was not executed until March of 1952 (T-1, p. 
222). 
Pursuant to this stipulation and agreement, Therald 
N. Jensen gave defendant a check for $1,077.97 about 
April 15, 1952 (T-1, p. 223; P's. Exh. E). This was the 
initial distribution of the escrowed funds from Consoli-
dated's operations. 
This background then brings us to June of 1952. This 
material is largely documentary in character and is not 
open to dispute. A recapitulation of the defendant's 
status as administrator and trustee at this time is essen-
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tial in evaluating the conflict of testimony relative to the 
deeds given by plaintiff's to defendant in June of 1952. 
Prior to June 1952, defendant had received and 
deposited from the leases of 1949-50 $7,329.71. He had 
received $335.00 from lessees in side deals. He had pro-
duced ores in 1949 which gave him $560.04. He had re-
ceived $1,077.97 as the initial distribution of royalties on 
Consolidated's operations. He had operated a sublease 
under Continental or Consolidated in 1950 which had 
yielded him a profit of $6,560.23. Continental had agreed 
to give him 32,500 shares of ·Consolidated stock, to pay 
legal costs incurred by defendant, and to hold him harm-
less from any claims for ores produced prior to ~fay 16, 
1950. He had entered into the stipulation and agreement 
whereby he was to receive 3.53% interest in all claims 
on Temple Mountain covering a much larger area than 
the Camp Bird Claims, and the other parties had waived 
any claims for accountings arising prior to the agree-
ment. The Temple l\lountain litigation was at an end with 
the exception of whether the l\Iigliaccio group would get 
5% interest in the whole area or get seven mining claims. 
In this setting, while acting as the administrator of 
the estatP, and trustee under the 1950 deeds defendant 
obtained fron1 his brother and sisters quitclaim deeds of 
the 1nining claims covering all of Temple l\Iountain ac-
quired in the December 15, 1951 stipulation and agree-
ment (P's. Exh. A-1 to A-6, inclusive). 
There is a sharp conflict in the evidence offered as 
to the conversations had relative to these 1952 deeds. 
The evidence of plaintiffs was to the effect that these 
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deeds were given to defendant upon his request and 
assertion that he would hold the property so conveyed 
for the use and benefit of plaintiffs and would divide any 
proceeds derived therefrom equally. Defendant on the 
other hand testified that the deeds were given in order 
to convey both the legal and equitable title to defendant, 
and that defendant undertook the risk of distributing to 
plaintiffs their share of their father's estate and agreed 
to hold them harmless from any claims that they return 
the money. The court after hearing this conflicting evi-
dence found that defendant had represented to plaintiffs 
that he would hold the property in trust for them (Find-
ing No. 33, R. 85). Analysis of the evidence demonstrates 
there was ample evidence in the record to support this 
finding. 
In May of 1952 defendant mailed a set of Quitclaim 
Deeds to his mother for each of the plaintiffs to sign 
(T-1. p. 272). Around the end of May, 1952, Mrs. Cisney 
after receiving her deed had a conversation with defend-
ant relative to the execution of the deeds. She asked him 
what would happen to their interest in the claims if they 
gave him the deeds. Defendant told her that if anything 
was derived from the claims he would distribute this to 
all the heirs equally (T-1, p. 14; T-1, p. 30; T-1, p. 32; 
T-1, p. 44; T-1, p. 47). Following this conversation and 
before the deeds were executed, Mrs. Cisney relayed this 
information to the other plaintiffs (T-1, p. 31 to 33, incl.; 
T-1, p. 77; T-1, p. 122; T-1, p. 134). 
Plaintiffs' testimony was to the effect that they had 
left the management and control of the affairs of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
estate to defendant as adminstrator and trustee, and 
had little personal knowledge of any of the affairs of the 
estate or defendant's dealing with the property (T-1, p. 
37; T-1, p. 49; T-1, p. 62; T-1, p. 105; T-1, p. 316). They 
stated that when defendant requested the deeds they 
were not suspicious of any ulterior motive of defendant, 
and since they had previously conveyed the Camp Bird 
Claims to him so he could deal with them, they believed 
the deeds covering all the Temple l\Iountain claims were 
needed by defendant to enable him to continue to deal 
with the property. They said they had no reason to sus-
pect he was doing anything but looking out for their 
best interests (T-1, p. 30; T-1, p. 58; T-1, p. 79; T-1, p. 89; 
T-1, p. 97; T-1, p. 105; T-1, p. 109; T-1, p. 132). They did 
not seek advice from anyone as to whether or not they 
should sign the deeds, relying on their brother and feeling 
that advice was not necessary (T-1, p. 96; T-1, p. 1-±2; 
T-1, p. 152; T-1, p. 154). They were trying to co-operate 
with him and \vere going along \\ith the rest of the family 
(T-1, p. 65; T-1, p. 48). Even defendant testified in re-
lating a conversation relative to estate 1natters that 
plaintiffs relied upon his judgment (T-1, p. 266). 
At about the time the 1952 deeds were executed, each 
of plaintiffs were given a check in the a1nount of $500. 
This money was taken by defendant from the estate bank 
account and was from royalties earned under the 1949-50 
Leases. Smne of the plaintiffs testified that they did 
not know of the $500 check at the ti1ne they executed the 
deed (T-1, p. 55; T-1, p. 137). At the tiine the $500 pay-
Inents were n1ade to plaintiffs, defendant took a like dis-
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tribution for himself (D's. Exh. 21). None of the defend-
ant's own money was ever given to plaintiffs (T-1, p. 324). 
The testimony of defendant in this connection offers 
an interesting comparison. On direct examination, de-
fendant testified that in June of 1952 he advised plain-
tiffs there was about $6800 in royalty monies accumu-
lated, and that the Camp Bird claims had been converted 
into a fractional interest in the whole group of Temple 
Mountain claims, (T-1, p. 273). He said plaintiffs told 
him they did not care what claims he got or what money 
he got, but that they felt the part of the accumulated 
royalties which had been deposited to the estate account 
should be distributed to them (T-1, p. 274). He said he 
had previously advised plaintiffs that there were adverse 
claimants and he could not distribute this money to then1 
as he believed he might have to give it back as a result 
of the Migliaccio group's claims in the quiet title action 
(T-1, p. 277), and that in attempting to find a way to get 
the money distributed, he suggested that they take thi~ 
money and he would take the claims and if the Migliaccio 
group recovered the royalty monies he would absorb this 
loss (T-1, p. 274, 277). 
On cross examination it was developed that he had 
paid himself an equal amount in the distribution. To this 
he said the agreement reached was that he was to take 
the claims, and the money in the account was to be divid-
ed equally among all of the heirs ( T -1, p. 286). He said 
that it was also part of the agreement that in addition he 
was to receive all of the royalty money paid to him by 
Therald Jensen (T-1, p. 278), and then that the distribu-
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tion was to be made only of the money left after he had 
paid off all the expenses for attorneys fees and the like 
from the estate account (T-1, p. 285). Defendant later 
testified the agreement was that plaintiffs were to get 
$500 each and for this reason he inserted this figure into 
the deeds as the consideration for them (T-1, p. 314). 
Plaintiffs testified that at no time was there any 
agreement that defendant was to take both the legal and 
equitable title to the mining claims and they would take 
only a distribution of the monies on hand in the royalty 
account (T-1, p. 64; T-1, p. 75; T-1, p. 90; T-1, p. 338; 
T-1, p. 339). 
Plaintiffs testified and the Court found that at the time 
defendant obtained the 1952 deeds he did not discuss 
with plaintiffs, nor did they have knowledge of the pro-
gress being made with the estate as to when it might be 
ready to be closed, the status of the quiet title action in-
volving the property nor the existance of the 1951 stipu-
lation and agreement, the receipt by defendant of the 
royalty payn1ents frmn Therald Jensen in the anwunt of 
$1077.97, the receipt of the side papnents to defendant 
from the lessees in 1949-50, the receipts of defendant 
from his lease operations as sublessee of Continental, 
the mnount of ore produced frmn the nrining clain1s and 
the interest of plaintiffs therein, the agreement for 
defendant to receive the 32,500 shares of stock of Con-
solidated, or the value of the n1ining clain1s insofar as 
then known to defendant. The Court further found these 
facts were known by defendant. (Finding No. 37). 
Defendant in his evidence did not offer anything 
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to show that he disclosed to plaintiffs that he received 
the side payments from the Lessees in 1949-50, that he 
had leased the Camp Bird No. 12 claim from Continental 
and mined it, nor that he had an agreement to receive the 
32,500 shares of stock of Consolidated. He admitted that, 
although he had been mining the property and knew of 
Consolidated's operations, he did not advise plaintiffs as 
to the value of the property, and, on the contrary, he 
testified he had told them there was no way to determine 
the value of the claims (T-1, p. 275). He further testified 
that he had told plaintiffs that giving the deeds looked 
like the only way a distribution of the estate money could 
be made (T-1, p. 274). On cross examination, however, 
he testified that there had been no change in the quiet 
title action or the affairs of the estate from June 1952, 
when he told plaintiffs the money could not be distri-
buted, and February, 1953, when he in fact obtained a 
decree of distribution (T-1, p. 332). 
Relative to defendant's testimony that he undertook 
to hold plaintiffs harmless against the possibility of 
having to return the distribution made to them, an ex-
amination of the Court records in Civil No. 1713 reveals 
that in June of 1952, when the deeds were obtained, the 
_Migliaccio group were making no claim for damages for 
ores removed from Temple Mountain whatsoever. Fur--
thermore, at no time did the Migliaccio group make any 
claim for damages against defendant. It is noteworthy 
that until defendant gave up his claim to the Camp Bird 
claims in Civil No. 1713, and recognized the fractional 
interest, both he and 1\fr. Migliaccio had been represented 
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by the same groups of attorneys, indicating that there 
was no conflict of interest. Attention is also called to the 
agreement of Continental to hold defendant harmless 
against any claim for ores removed prior to May 16, 1950 
( P's. Exh. 0). All of the money distributed in 1952 was 
from royalties received prior to that date. 
Defendant testified that following the execution of 
the 1952 deeds, plaintiffs had no interest whatsoever ill 
the property (T-1, p. 316). In spite of this testimony, on 
.July 21, 1952, defendant, in depositing the second royalty 
payment from Therald Jensen amounting to $327, made 
the notation on his bank statement describing this deposit 
"Royalty to Estate." (D's. Ex. 22). Plaintiff A. E. Tom-
linson testified of a conversation in July of 1952 with 
defendant when defendant said he needed the second 
set of deeds to keep the property going for the benefit of 
the estate (T-1, p. 102), and of another conversation ·with 
defendant in the spring of 1954, when defendant told him 
he was receiving a s1nall a1nount of royalty but not 
enough to be divided at that time (T-1, p. 103). 
Following the execution of the 1952 deeds, defendant 
made two additional distributions to plaintiffs, the first 
on July 19, 1952, a1nounting to $50, and the second X o-
vember 31, 1953, amounting to $42.50. A1l of these were 
from the smne estate account, and as to each he paid 
himself as 1nuch or 1nore than he gave plaintiffs. (Ps'. 
Ex. B-1, B-2; Def. Ex. B-8, B-9, B-10, B-11, B-12, B-13, 
B-14, B-17, B-18; Def. Ex. 21, Def. Ex. N-7, N-4.) 
On each occasion that defendant made a distribution 
payment to plaintiffs, he gave a check in a like a1nount 
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to his mother, Lillie M. Tomlinson (Def. Ex. B-15, B-16, 
N-5). 
Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, the 
trial court concluded that defendant had expressly agreed 
to hold the property in trust. It further concluded that 
had it not been for this promise, the transaction would 
have been so unfair and lacking in disclosure of material 
facts that a constructive trust would have arisen. 
Following the execution of the 1952 deeds, plaintiffs 
testified that they assumed defendant was holding the 
property for their use and benefit, and were not aware 
of any contention on his part to the contrary, until No-
vember 31, 1953, when Mrs. Fuller was advised by her 
mother when she was given the last check from defend-
ant that there would be no more money coming to then1 
(T-1, p. 87-89). She advised Mrs. Cisney of this (T-1, p. 
52), and the two of them became apprehensive of the 
situation. They contacted Stephens, Brayton & Lowe, 
attorneys, who requested an accounting from defendant 
(T-1, p. 281; T-1, p. 143). In May of 1954, defendant 
advised plaintiffs' attorneys that he recognized no inter-
est of plaintiffs. This was the first plaintiffs learnerl 
from defendant that he did not acknowledge he was hold-
ing the property for their use and benefit, and claimed 
both the legal and equitable title to the property (T-1, p. 
30; T-1, p. 64; T-1, p. 84; T-1, p. 104; T-1, p. 139). 
As stated above, on December 19, 1950, Continental 
authorized and directed the issuance to defendant of 
32,500 shares of Consolidated stock held in its treasury 
(Ps'. Ex. V). In his answer defendant admits this stock 
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was received as a result of transactions relating to the 
property (R. 16; 24). The stock was sold by defendant 
for $23,623.70 (Ps'. Ex. U). Defendant testified that he 
had been employed as a carpenter and foreman by Mr. 
Frawley from February to June of 1950 and had not been 
paid anything for this work but ~Ir. Frawley had 
promised him he would receive the stock in payment for 
his work (T-1, p. 206, 207). He testified this was the 
only reason for his getting the stock (T-1, p. 311). 
In direct contravention to this testimony, defendant 
offered the testimony of C. Allen Elggren, Secretary of 
Continental, that they had paid defendant an ordinary 
wage for his work, and that the stock was not given to 
him for his services as carpenter or foreman (T-2, p. 210, 
218). 
The number of shares received by defendant -was 
exactly one-half the number agreed to be given to him 
under the agreements with Continental (Ps '. Ex. 0). 
In view of defendant's adn1ission that the stock was 
received from dealings with the property, the time at 
which the stock was authorized for hi1n, and the direct 
conflict in defendant's evidence explaining what the stock 
was given to him for if not for his relinquishing his 
claims to the Camp Bird clanns and accepting the frac-
tional interests in the group of clanns, the Court con-
cluded that the shares of stock were receiYed in lieu of th~ 
65,000 shares previously agreed to be given to him, and 
as a result of his dealings with the property. 
On February 10, 1953, pursuant to a petition of 
defendant a Decree of Distribution in the Estate was 
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signed by the Court. This recited the fact that plain-
tiffs had given Quitclaim Deeds to the defendant and 
made distribution to defendant of all of the residue of 
the estate. The trial court ruled there was nothing in 
the probate proceedings which would make the plaintiffs 
aware of any contention on the part of defendant as to 
the equitable ownership of the claims, and that from the 
probate proceedings they would be aware only that the 
defendant was having distributed .to him the legal title 
to the claims in the estate. 
In his accounting defendant claimed credit for attor-
neys' fees paid to K. K. Steffensen of $525 and to C. 
Allen Elggren of $200 (Def. Ex. 21, T-2, p.157; Def. Exh. 
N -3). Plaintiffs contended that these were not properly 
allowable in view of the agreement with ·Continental and 
E. G. Frawley whereby it was agreed that these would 
be paid for by Continental (Ps'. Ex. 0; Ps'. Ex. C), de-
fendant's testimony that he made no effort to collect 
these from Continental (T-2, p. 168), and the fact that 
C. Allen Elggren was secretary of Continental. The court 
allowed these credits. 
Each of the statements contained in the foregoing 
Statement of Facts is consistent with the findings of the 
trial court in this action. Defendant in his statement of 
facts ignores entirely that he is faced with a finding of 
fact of the trial court contrary to the statements therein 
contained. At no place in his brief does he contend that 
the trial court was erroneous in making these finding~, 
or that the findings \vere without support in the evidence. 
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Rather, the statements of facts of defendant consists only 
of a repetition of his position in the trial court below. 
The specific statements of defendant with which re-
spondents disagree are as follows: 
1. On page 2, defendant states that in 1942 the 
estate's interest in the Camp Bird claims was reduced to 
TY2 % by stipulation with other locators. The stipulation 
and the files of Civil No. 1466 do not mention Camp Bird 
claims. 
2. On page 3, defendant states that the heirs com-
pelled the removal of the administrator of the Tomlinson 
estate in February of 1949. There is nothing in the 
record as to the cause of the removal other than resigna-
tion. 
3. On page 3, defendant states that leases entered 
into by defendant in 1949-50 provided for a royalty of 
15 per cent and the Atomic Energy Commission, the only 
purchaser, was advised of the lease agree1nents and all 
royalty checks were paid to the estate's bank account at 
Grand Junction, Colorado. The evidence is that the ores 
produced under these leases were sold to both rnited 
States Yanadium Cmnpany and An1erican Sn1elting and 
Refining Con1pany as agent for the A.E.C. Ore ship-
ments began as early as October 1949 (Ps'. Ex. X). The 
only evidence of advice relative to the lease agreen1ents 
is two letters to A1nerican Smelting & Refining Company 
dated December 7, 1949 authorizing deduction of royalties 
on ores produced by two of the lessees (D's. Ex. 2, 6). 
There is nothing in the record to show any such notifica-
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tion being sent to U.S.V., or to A.S. & R. before December 
7, 1949, or that such notices were sent covering other 
lessees than those mentioned. Further, there is nothing 
in the record to show that these authorizations were 
binding on the purchasers so they could not pay over all 
the ore proceeds to the producer, and in fact such was 
the case (Ps'. Ex. N). 
4. On pages 3 and 4, defendant states that in J anu-
ary 1950, defendant entered into a lease arrangement 
with E. G. Frawley and that this agreement recited that 
conflicts with the Camp Bird claims were without merit. 
The January 1950 agreement was a contract of sale and 
not a lease. It contained a recital that defendant was un-
certain concerning the status and affairs of the Estate, 
but on information received he believed the attorney for 
the estate by stipulation, without authority and after the 
death of A. L. Tomlinson, had tried to dispose of certain 
interests in the mining claims (Ps'. Ex. 0). 
5. On page 5, defendant states that the stipulation 
and agreement of December 15, 1951 provided that be-
cause of litigation the royalty money from Consolidated's 
operations were to be held in a trust account. On the 
contrary, the stipulation and agreement provided that 
the trust monies would be distributed to the parties pur-
suant to that agreement, and in fact, the monies were so 
distributed (Ps'. Ex. E; Ps'. Ex. F). 
6. On page 6, defendant says that in February of 
1953 upon due notice to plaintiffs, the probate court con-
firmed the Deeds and distributed the property to the de-
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fendant. The probate file shows that the notice of the 
hearing was not received by plaintiff Acott or Fuller 
(D's. Ex. 18). Further, Mrs. Shockley testified that she 
was not living at the address to which the notice was sent 
and did not believe she received any such notice (T-1, p. 
7 6). There was nothing in the order of the Court which 
confirmed the 1952 Deeds. 
7. On page 6, defendant states that plaintiffs had 
been dissatisfied with Estate matters since June of 1942 
and that this was the reason for the change of adminis-
trators in January of 1949. There is nothing in the 
record to support this statement. 
8. On page 6, defendant states that plaintiffs ·were 
demanding that the administrator distribute the estate 
property. Defendant's testimony was that they were 
discussing how the money could be distributed from the 
Bank, and his words ·were that plaintiffs were "wondering 
how we could get that money out" (T-1, p. 26S). Defend-
ant further states that the dissatisfaction beca1ne acute 
in 1951. There is nothing in the record relative to any 
conversations for the distribution of the money prior to 
the conversation in the spring of 1952 (T-1, p. 268). 
9. On page 6, defendant states that the attorney 
for the estate sent a letter to defendant to clarify the 
situation as to why the nwney could not be distributed. 
Defendant's state1nent adds that the letter was sent to de-
fendant's n1other who showed it to plaintiffs. The testi-
Inony of the plaintiffs was that they had not seen this 
letter. Further, the letter (D's. Ex. E) is a report of the 
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estate attorney to defendant, the tenor of which would 
indicate that as early as June 25, 1951 the estate was 
approaching a point at which it could be closed. The sug-
gestion contained in the letter that the distribution of 
money be held back relates to a demand of Hansen or 
Jensen for an accounting of royalties received by defend-
ant and ascribes this as the only reason for keeping the 
estate open. The stipulation and agreement of December 
15, 1951 resolved this when the parties agreed to waive 
any accounting (Ps'. Ex. F). Defendant's statement goes 
on that following this stipulation and agreement, the 
case was still undecided and other conflicts were un-
determined and for this reason the estate could not be 
closed and the distribution made. An examination of the 
court files in Civil No. 1713 reveals no claim of any party 
pending in June of 1952, wherein any assertion is made 
which would require an accounting from the defendant. 
Further, defendant actually distributed the estate of 
February 10, 1953 and testified that nothing had tran-
spired in Civil No. 1713 between June of 1952, when de-
fendant obtained the deeds and February of 1953, which 
made distribution possible on the latter date but not 
possible on the June 1952 date (T-1, p. 332). 
10. On page 7, defendant states that none of the 
adverse claimants in Civil No. 1713 was aware of the 
amount of ore removed from the Camp Bird claims by 
defendant in 1949 and 1950. There is nothing in the record 
to support this statement and it is submitted that the 
agreement of December 15, 1951 waiving any claim for 
an accounting renders this immaterial. 
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11. On page 7, it is stated that plaintiffs and defend-
ant agreed that defendant would assume all expenses re-
lating to the mining claims and would make no claim 
against the plaintiffs. The court specifically found this 
not to be the fact (Finding of Fact No. 49, R. p. 89). 
12. On page 7, defendant states that at the hearing 
of the petition for distribution plaintiff Schockley and 
Mr. Lawrence Fuller were present in the court room. 
Defendant testified that none of the heirs was present at 
the hearing on the Decree of Distribution (T-1, p. 279). 
Further, there is nothing in the record that Mr. La·wrence 
Fuller, husband of plaintiff, was present at the hearing. 
13. On page 7, defendant states that all of the plain-
tiffs testified that after June of 1952 they did not evi-
dence any further interest until April 1954. There is 
nothing in the record to support this statement. Plaintiff 
A. E. Tomlinson testified that in July 1952 he had a con-
versation ·with defendant asking about the deeds and 
estate matters (T-1, p. 102). 
14. On page 8, defendant states that in ..... -\pril 195-! 
plaintiffs received a letter frmn John Lowe, plaintiff's at-
torney, advising the1n they had an interest in the Te1nple 
.Mountain properties and that he could recover it for 
the1n. This state1nent is not supported by the record and 
is completely contrary to the evidence adduced at the 
hearing (T-1, p. 87 to 89; T-1, p. 5:2; T-1, p. ~81; T-1, p. 
143; T-1, p. 30; T-1, p. G.f: T-1, p. 84; T-1, p.10±; T-1, p. 
139). In view of the inference in this state1nent that Mr. 
Lowe is guilty of barratry, counsel as a matter of per-
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sonal privilege advises the court that the following are 
the circumstances of how the representation of plaintiffs 
came about: An inquiry was received during December 
of 1953 from the Fullers and Cisneys relative to the 
representation of plaintiffs in attempting to determine 
whether or not defendant was acting properly under his 
trust. Counsel agreed to represent plaintiffs and wrote a 
letter to defendant requesting that he arrange a time for 
counsel to review the estate accounts and asking for are-
conveyance of the claims in view of the fact that all of the 
Temple Mountain litigation had been resolved. Defendant 
wrote counsel the letter which is plaintiff's exhibit IL 
Following receipt of this letter, counsel again wrote de-
fendant to clarify his position and thereafter received a 
call from C. Allen Elggren who advised counsel of de-
fendant's position that he did not admit plaintiffs had 
any interest in the Temple Mountain properties nor was 
he willing to give an accounting to the parties. Following 
receipt of this information, and in June 1954, counsel 
wrote plaintiffs advising them of defendant's position. 
Counsel states that at no time did they solicit to repre-
sent plaintiffs in this action. 
15. On page 8, defendant states that he assisted 
:Jlr. Frawley in locating other claims and relocating exist-
ing claims on Temple ~fountain. This statement is not 
supported in the record. 
16. On page 8, defendant states that in the fall of 
1952 ~Ir. Frawley gave defendant shares of stock. The 
record shows this stock was given to defendant by Con-
tinental :L\Iining and :Milling Company (Ps'. Exh. V). 
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17. On page 8, defendant states that the stock was 
given by reason of work he had done over a two-year 
period. Defendant's testimony was that the stock was 
given as compensation for his work as foreman and car-
penter during the period from February to June of 1950 
(T-1, p. 206-7) and for no other reason (T-1, p. 311). 
~fr. Elggren testified defendant was paid for this work, 
and that it was not given for this work (T-2, p. 210, 219). 
18. On page 9, defendant states that ~Irs. Cisney 
testified she signed the 1952 deed believing it was re-
quired to enable defendant to enter into a lease. The 
testimony of Mrs. Cisney was that she signed the deed 
upon defendant's statement that he would hold the prop-
erty for plaintiffs and divide anything received from it 
equally (T-1, p. 14), and that she was trying to cooperate 
with defendant (T-1, p. 48). 
19. On page 9, defendant states that plaintiffs 
stated they did not rely on defendant in executing the 
1952 deeds. ·Contrary to this, plaintiffs testifi_ed they 
were relying on defendant (T-1, p. 30: T-1. p. 79; T-1. 
p. 86; T-1, p. 97; T-1, p. 105: T-1. p. 109; T-1. p. 132). 
20. On page 10, defendant states plaintiffs adnritted 
the~r were told the estate could not be distributed until 
the title and conflicting clain1s were settled. Plaintiff 
deny any such adn1issions are contained in the record, 
and contend there wa8 no reason for defendant to with-
hold distribution of the estate in 1952. 
21. On page 10, defendant states that during the 
trial plaintiffs claimed a privilege as to matters discussed 
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with their husbands. No evidence was excluded whatso-
ever upon a husband-wife privilege. 
22. On page 10, defendant states that Mr. Cisney, 
who is not a party, testified he knew the claims had been 
leased to Consolidated and that defendant had been 
promised some stock by Mr. Frawley. Mr. Cisney's testi-
mony was that he was on the property in April of 1950. 
(T-2, p. 48). This was before Consolidated carne onto 
the property, and was immediately after the 1950 deed 
had been given, when Continental had moved onto the 
property pursuant to the agreement of January 1950. 
The stock which Mr. Cisney referred to in his testimony 
was 56,000 shares of stock through Continental (T-2, p. 
51). The only place 56,000 shares of stock is mentioned 
is in a typographical error in the letter sent by defendant 
to each of the plaintiffs asking for the 1950 deeds, which 
all of plaintiffs received (P's Exh. C). 
23. On page 11, defendant states the only testimony 
in the r.ecord as to the value of the claims in 1952 is the 
amount of royalty produced on the claims in 1949-50, 
which was known to plaintiffs. Defendant testified he 
had a sublease on the Camp Bird 12 mining claim and 
produced ores giving him $23,000 and that he saw the 
extent of Consolidated's operations. From these two 
factors, defendant was in a position to have information 
upon which an opinion of value could be based, which 
should have been conveyed to plaintiffs but was not. 
24. On page 12, defendant makes a statement rela-
tive to the testimony of Mrs. Lillie Tomlinson, mother 
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of the parties. The sum total of Mrs. Tomlinson's testi-
mony reflects that of a very elderly person who has 
little or no recollection or understanding whatsoever of 
the events that transpired in connection with the deeds. 
On cross examination the answers she gave to most of the 
questions reflected a parroting of the statements de-
fendant's counsel made in connection with objections to 
questions put to her. It is noteworthy that in a deposition 
taken by defendant on August 8, 1955, approximately one 
month before the trial of the case, and in response to 
questions asked her by defendant's counsel, Mrs. Tom-
linson testified, with respect to the 1950 deeds, that the 
plaintiffs were to have no further interest in the property 
after the 1950 deeds ( T -1, p. 199 to 203), even though de-
fendant concedes that in 1950 the deeds were given to 
him on an express trust for plaintiffs' benefit. Indicative 
of the character of the witness and her testimony is a 
statement of the Court during her redirect examination 
when plaintiff's counsel objected to a question put to her. 
The Court said, "Ordinarily, I would sustain that objec-
tion, but bearing in mind the witness, why I will let it 
stay." (T-1, p. 241) 
25. On page 12, defendant states that evidence in 
the accounting offered by plaintiffs discloses the liability 
which the estate was subject to on June 2, 1952, and 
that since defendant onl~- had a 57o interest in the Camp 
Bird claims, the Tomlinson interest in the ores produced 
in 1949-50 would a1nount to only $800.00, with the re-
mainder belonging to the other parties to the 19±:2 stipu-
lation. This statement ignores entirely the effect of the 
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December 15, 1951 stipulation and agreement whereby 
all of the parties he refers to waived any accounting for 
ores theretofore produced (P's. Exh. F), and the agree-
ment of Continental Mining and Milling Company of 
July 1950, whereby Continental agrees to hold defendant 
harmless against all claims for ores produced by defend-
ant prior to May 16, 1950 (P's. Exh. 0). 
26. On page 12, defendant states that on June ~' 
1952, it was admitted by all plaintiffs that they knew 
the Tomlinson interest had been reduced to 5%. This is· 
contrary to plaintiff's evidence, which was they did not 
lmow of this reduction. (T-1, p. 37; T-1, p. 96; T-1, p. 
105; T-1, p. 60; T-1, p.128; T-1, p.140.) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT DEFEND-
ANT HOLDS THE MINING PROPERTIES ~CONVEYED TO 
HIM BY PLAINTIFFS IN TRUST FOR THE USE AND 
BENEFIT OF PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
POINT TWO 
THE REQUIREMENT THAT DEFENDANT ACCOUNT 
TO PLAINTIFFS FOR THE PROCEEDS DERIVED FROM 
THE SHARES OF STOCK RECEIVED BY HIM WAS PRO-
PER. 
POINT THREE 
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT GUILTY OF LACHES IN AS-
SERTING THEIR RIGHTS. 
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POINT FOUR 
THE MATTERS RAISED IN 'THIS ACTION WERE NOT 
BEFORE THE PROBATE COURT AND THE DECREE OF 
DISTRIBUTION IS NOT RES JUDICA'TA IN THIS ACTION. 
CROSS-APPEAL 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REQUIRE DE-
FENDANT TO ACCOUNT TO PLAINTIFFS FOR THEIR 
SHARE OF THE SUM OF $6,273.93 BEING THE DIFFER-
ENCE BETWEEN $13,603.61 ROYALTIES ACCRUED UN-
DER VARIOUS LEASES MADE BY DEFENDANT IN 1949 
AND 1950 AND $7,329.71 THE AMOUNT SHOWN TO HAVE 
BEEN DEPOSITED IN BANK ACCOUNTS BY DEFENDANT. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REQUIRE D::-
FENDANT TO ACCOUNT TO PLAINTIFFS FOR THEIR 
SHARE OF THE SUM OF $6,560.23 BEING THE PROFIT 
RECEIVED BY DEFENDANT ON A LEASE FROM CON-
TINENTAL MINING AND l\IILLING CO:\IPANY AND jOR 
CONSOLIDATED URANIU:\I MINES, INC. IN 1950. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT ERRED IN A "rARDING PLAINTIFFS 
TWELVE TWENTY-FIRS'TS INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY 
AND MONEY AS TO WHICH DEFENDANT WAS REQUIRED 
TO ACCOUNT RATHER THAN THREE-FOURTHS INTER-
EST. 
POINT FOUR 
THE ·COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT A 
CREDI'T ON HIS ACCOUNTING FOR THE SUM: OF $525.00 
pAID TO K. K. STEFFENSON AND THE SUl\I OF $200.00 
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THE RULING OF THE TRIAL ·COURT THA:T DEFEND-
ANT HOLDS THE MINING PROPERTIES CONVEYED TO 
HIM BY PLAINTIFFS IN TRUS'T FOR THE USE AND 
BENEFIT OF PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
In his brief appellant contends that the conclusions 
and judgment of the trial court that defendant holds the 
mning properties received by him in trust for plain. 
tiffs must be reversed as a matter of law. 
He discussed several propositions in this connection 
·which will be discusseq. in the order presented by appel-
lant. 
(a) Defendant argues that an express trust and a 
constructive trust cannot exist as to the same property 
at the same time. Without pursuing the academic con-
siderations raised by this argument, the question may be 
resolved simply by an examination of the Conclusions of 
the trial court whereby it can readily be seen that this is 
not the position taken by the court. 
It concluded in paragraphs one and two of the con-
clusions that an express trust arose under both the 1950 
and the 1952 deeds. There can be no question as to the 
correctness of the conclusion that the conveyance of the 
mining claims under the 1950 deeds was under an express 
trust, since this was admitted by defendant (T-1, p. 2-5). 
The conclusion that an express trust arose under the 1952 
deeds results from the Court finding that in obtaining 
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the 1952 deeds defendant declared he would hold the min-
ing properties for the use and benefit of plaintiffs and 
in trust for them (Finding Nos. 33, 34). That this finding 
was amply supported by the evidence will be discussed 
hereafter. 
In Conclusion 3, the Court said: 
"Because of his fiduciary position as admin-
istrator of the Tomlinson Estate, and as trustee 
under the 1950 deeds, and because of the trust and 
confidence placed in him as plaintiff's brother, de-
fendant owed to plaintiffs and each of them the 
duty of dealing with them with absolute fairness. 
If defendant, in obtaining the deeds from plain-
tiffs in June of 1952, intended to acquire their 
interests for himself and not in trust for plaintiffs, 
he owed them the duty of fully disclosing to them 
all material facts known to him which would have 
any bearing upon plaintiffs' decision to convey 
their interest. Since he failed to disclose the 
matter set forth in Finding of Fact No. 37, all of 
which are material facts, if he intended to obtain 
their interest absolutely and not in trust for plain-
tiffs, he would have been taking unfair advantage 
of plaintiff's trust and confidence in hin1 and in 
violation of his fiduciary duties, so that, apart 
from any express trust, a constructive trust for 
plaintiffs' use and benefit 1could result." (Em-
phasis added.) 
Frmn this it can be readily seen that the Court con-
cluded that there was an express trust, but that even 
without the statement of defendant that he would hold 
the property in trust for plaintiffs under the evidence 
presented to the Court, the transaction ,,-as so unfair 
and there was such a lack of disclosure of the material 
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facts which defendant was under a duty to disclose, that 
a constructive trust would result from the transaction. 
It is well settled in the law that whenever a fiduciary 
attempts to obtain the property in his trust from the 
beneficiary, he must disclose to the beneficiaries all the 
material facts which he knows or should know, must not 
use the influence of his position to induce the consent of 
the beneficiary, and the transaction must be in all re-
spects fair and reasonable. 2 Scott on Trusts, Sec. 170.25, 
p. 909 ; Sec. 170, p. 856. 
(b) Appellant next argues that respondents did 
not in fact have trust and confidence in defendant, and 
claims they were negligent in not checking up on their 
brother. This is contrary to Finding of Fact Nos. 34 and 
44, and the evidence of plaintiffs. Further, it ignores the 
duties imposed as a matter of law upon persons acting 
in fiduciary capacities which regulate their conduct. It is 
submitted that a more rigid fiduciary duty than that 
which appellant had to respondents is hard to imagine. 
It flows from three separate and distinct sources: (1) 
Defendant's duty as administrator of the Tomlinson 
Estate; ( 2) Defendant's duties as trustee under the 
express trust created at the time the 1950 deeds were 
obtained, and (3) the duties arising from the confidential 
relationship existing between members of a family. 
Indicative of the duty which defendant owed plain-
tiffs arising out of these fiduciary relationships is the 
statement of Justice Cardozo in the case of Meinhard 
v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 62 A.L.R. 1, 
quoted in 2 Scott on Trusts, p. 909, where he said: 
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"Many forms of conduct permissible in a 
workaday world for those acting at arm's length, 
are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. 
A trustee is held to something stricter than the 
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but 
the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is 
then the standard of behavior. As to this there 
has developed a tradition that is unending and 
inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the 
attitudes of courts of equity when petitioned to 
undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 
'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions. 
Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries 
been kept at a level higher than that trodden by 
the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by 
any judgment of this court." 
Defendant's argument as to the fiduciary relation-
ship appears to lack only the words "caveat emptor" in 
being a complete renunciation of the fundamental duties 
of a fiduciary. His argument proceeds frmu a premise 
which is contrary to the findings of fact of the trial court 
relative to plaintiffs' reliance upon defendant, and then 
continues that the lack of knowledge of plaintiffs "\'las 
due to their negligence. The argun1ent ignores the fact 
that even defendant's testin1ony did not demonstrate that 
he had disclosed to plaintiffs that he had been getting 
money on side deals frmn the lessees, that he had 1nade 
substantial sun1s of 1noney subleasing the property from 
Continental, that Continental \nls giYing hi1n $23,000 
worth of 8tock, that he had passed on to the1n what in-
fonnation he had upon which an opinion of the value of 
the elaims could be based testif~-ing that he told then1 the 
value couldn't be detennined. He n1isrepresented to them 
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that the money in the estate might have to be given back 
because of the Migliaccio group's assertions in the law-
suit. From defendant's own testimony, if it were be-
lieved in its entirety, there would be established a case 
for the imposition of a constructive trust arising out 
of defendant's fiduciary duties. 
(c) In his third proposition, appellant argues that 
the character of plaintiff's evidence is such as requires 
a reversal of the trial court's ruling. 
He argues that plaintiffs had a burden of proving its 
case by clear and convincing evidence, supposing that the 
problem is one of establishing defendant's fraud. Rather 
than the plaintiffs having to prove their case by clear 
and convincing evidence, the burden of proof is upon the 
defendant to establish the adequacy of the consideration 
for the purchase and the fairness of the transaction. 
In 33 C.J.S. 1283, Executors and Administrators, 
Sec. 268 ( 2) relative to purchases by executors or admin-
istrators from heirs, it is said that the court should 
"strongly presume against the validity of such a pur-
chase and require the fiduciary to show affirmatively 
adequacy of consideration and the general fairness of the 
transaction". 
In Ehrengren v. Gronlund, 19 Utah 411, 57 Pac. 
268, p. 270, this Court quoted from Jones v. Lloyd, 117 
Ill. 597, 7 N.E. 119, as follows: 
"Where a trustee sets up a bargain with his 
cestui que trust, or a release from him, the burden 
of proof is upon the former to vindicate the trans-
action from any shadow of suspicion, and to show 
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that it was perfectly fair and reasonable in every 
respect.'' 
In Burns v. Skogstad, Idaho, 206 Pac. 2d 765 at 769, 
in a case remarkably close to the case at bar, the Court 
said: 
"* * * it was the duty of the executor in 
dealing with these legatees to make a full dis-
cosure of all relevent facts and to treat them with 
utmost frankness. 3 Bogart Trusts and Trustees, 
Sec. 493 and 544. The burden was upon the de-
fendants to show that this duty was performed. 
This the defendants have not done. The record 
is silent as to what disclosures, in any, were made 
by the executor as to the condition, or value of 
the estate, or as to the interests of the legatees 
therein.'' 
Defendant in his brief cites a comment of the trial 
judge relative to the burden of proof, and says t:1i:' -wa' 
made in his oral decision. Respondents submit that ap-
pellant has taken this statement out of context. The com-
ment was made during an oral discussion between the 
court and counsel at the second hearing, some eighteen 
months after the initial hearing, as the Court was re-
freshing its recollection as to what defendant should 
account for. It had nothing to do "\Yith the clarity or con-
vincingness of the proof of establishing a trust. 
Respondents contend that they haYe n1ore than car-
ried any burden of proof they Inight haYe had in estab-
lishing the existance of an express trust arising out of 
the 1952 deeds, and that defendant did not sustain his 
burden of proof that the transaction was con1pletely fair 
and 1nade after a full disclosure of all n1aterial facts. 
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(d) Although defendant does not argue that the 
evidence presented at the hearing does not support the 
findings of fact of the trial court, and in fact ignores 
entirely that the court made any findings of fact, he does 
argue the matter of the weight which should be given to 
plaintiffs' evidence. He categorically states that plain-
tiffs were advised as to all rna terial facts except the value 
of the interest in the claims and the title situation without 
explaining upon what he bases this statement. The Court 
found that the disclosure of a large number of material 
facts was not made by defendant prior to obtaining the 
1952 deeds (Finding No. 37). This finding was consistent 
with the testimony and· evidence offered by plaintiffs. 
Counsel for defendant at the trial stipulated that plain-
tiff Cisney didn't know anything about the matters 
(T-1, p. 20) but in his brief argues that she did know of 
all material facts save the two mentioned. 
It is well settled that although this court on appeal 
will review the evidence, it will not disturb the findings 
of the trial court unless they are against the weight of 
the evidence. Shaw v. Jeppson, 121 U. 155, 239 P. 2d 745. 
(e) Defendant argues that although there need not 
be consideration for the 1952 deeds to be effective, in fact 
there was consideration because defendant agreed to pro-
tect the plaintiffs from any judgment or demand and to 
repay any funds ordered repaid by the Court, and to 
bear all expenses of the estate. Finding of Fact No. 45, 
which is supported by the Record of Civil No. 1713, shows 
no adverse claims were ever asserted against defendant. 
Finding No. 49 which is supported by the evidence, shows 
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that defendant did not agree with plaintiffs to assume 
the costs and expenses of the pro bate of the estate, nor 
agree to repay any funds. If defendant had undertaken 
these things as he contends, he would have been under 
the additional duty to tell the heirs that the 1951 stip-
ulation and agreement in Civil No. 1713 had waived any 
claim for accountings (Ps'. Exh. F) and that Continental 
Mining and Milling Company had agreed to pay the ex-
penses, and to hold them harmless from any demands 
for ores removed from the claims (Ps'. Exh. 0.). As set 
forth above, the question is not whether there was con-
sideration, but whether the fiduciary has vindicated a 
self dealing transaction "from any shadow of suspicion" 
and shown that "it was perfectly fair and reasonable in 
every respect.'' Ehrengren v. Gronlund, 19 {itah 411, 
57 Pac. 268. 
(f) Defendant argues that the statute of frauds 
prohibits the creation of an express trust. The statute of 
frauds is an affirmative defense and must be pleaded. 
It ''yas not pleaded and was therefore ,,-ai\ed. Rule S(c) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, when the parties 
are in a confidential relationship to one another, the 
courts will enforce an oral promise to hold property in 
trust even in the absence of fraud on the part of the 
promi8or. 1 Scott on Tntsfs, Sec. 442. p. 322. 
POINT TWO 
'THE REQUIREl\IENT THAT DEFENDANT ACCOUNT 
TO PLAINTIFFS FOR THE PROCEEDS DERIVED FROM 
THE SHARES OF STOCK RECEIVED BY HIM WAS PRO-
PER. 
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Defendant argues that a trust cannot be iinposed on 
property which is not a part of the estate and which was 
not in existance at the time the trust was created. His 
argument relates to the court's order requiring defendant 
to account to plaintiff's for the proceeds derived by de-
fendant on the sale of the 32,500 shares of stock received 
·by defendant from Continental Mining and Milling com-
pany. 
The trial court held that the stock was received by 
defendant as a result of his dealings with the mining 
property, and was in lieu of the 65,000 shares of stock 
which defendant was to receive under the January 1950 
agreements. The court did not hold that a trust existed 
over the stock itself. Rather it held that defendant was 
trustee of the mining properties, and must account to 
plaintiffs for all things derived therefrom. This in es-
sence is a holding that the income and profits derived 
from trust assets must be accounted for by a trustee. 
Just as appellant argues, there must be a trust res 
in order for a trust to exist. In this case, the trust res 
consisted of the mining properties. It is obvious that there 
is no rule of law that income or accretions from the trust 
res must be in existence at the time the trust is created 
in order to be a part of the trust. In this case, defendant 
might just as well argue that he is not accountable for 
the royalties derived from the mining claims since they 
were not in existence at the time of the creation of the 
trust. 
See 2 Scott on Trusts, Sec. 203, p.1093, quoted below. 
There is no issue as to whether or not the stock was 
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given as a result of defendant's dealing with the mining 
property. By his answer defendant admitted this was the 
case (R. 16; 24) and the Court so found. 
POINT THREE 
PLAINTIFF ARE NOT GUILTY OF LACHES IN AS-
SERTING THEIR RIGHTS. 
Defendant argues that plaintiffs are barred by 
laches. This defense was not raised by defendant in the 
court below and for this reason cannot be presented to 
the court on appeal for the first time. Further, laches 
is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded. Rule 
8 (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The evidence at the hearing discloses that plaintiffs 
did not delay in filing suit. It was not until June of 1954 
that plaintiffs learned defendant was not recognizing the 
trust (T-1, pp. 30, 64, 84, 104, 139). Suit was commenced 
September 24, 1954. 
2 Scott on Trusts, Sec. 219.2 states: 
"A beneficiarY is not barred bY laches from 
holding a trustee ·liable for breach ·of trust if he 
did not know or have reason to know of the breach 
of trust.'' 
Defendant had 1nade a payn1ent to plaintiffs as late 
as November 31, 1953, and they would hav-e no reason 
to know of an~, breach of trust prior to that tilne. 
Defendant does not show a change of position, hi:3 
argun1ent boiling down to the state1nent that plaintiffs 
were "negligent'' in trusting defendant. This suit is 
evidenre of the fact that they should not have trusted 
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their brother, but this is certainly not a basis for applying 
the doctrine of laches. 
POINT FOUR 
THE MATTERS RAISED IN 1THIS ACTION WERE NOT 
BEFORE THE PROBATE COURT AND THE DECREE OF 
DISTRIBUTION IS NOT RES JUDICA1TA IN THIS ACTION. 
Defendant argues that the probate decree in the 
Tomlinson estate is res judicata and determinative of th8 
rights of the parties in this action. Judge Keller was 
sitting as the trial judge in this action and was the pro-
bate judge in the Tomlinson estate matter. 
In his findings in this case he ruled, and we submit 
correctly so, that all the probate decree did was to pass 
legal title from the deceased to the grantee of all of the 
heirs. He said : 
"There was nothing in these probate pro-
ceedings which would make plaintiffs aware of 
any contention on the part of the defendant as 
to the equitable ownership of the claims, but they 
would be aware only that defendant was having 
distributed to him the legal title to the claims in 
the estate." 
He ruled further that the matter and things con-
tained in plaintiff's complaint and amended complaint 
were not before the court on that hearing and plaintiffs 
were not aware of any contention of defendant relative 
to his owning the equitable title until after the decree was 
entered in the probate proceedings and after the distri-
bution of monies to them by defendant in December of 
1953. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
40 
Both the 1950 and 1952 deeds were given to defend-
ant so that he could handle the property unfettered by 
the problems of joint ownership. To have the distribu-
tion made to himself as grantee under the deeds was 
certainly a material requirement of this design, in that 
without this he could not negotiate with the property 
without getting confirmation of the probate court since 
the legal title to the property would be in the decedenfs 
name. 
The probate record shows that all of plaintiffs were 
nonresidents at the time the decree was entered. It fur-
ther shows affirmatively that some of plaintiffs did not 
receive notice of the hearing on the decree. None of them 
was present in the court at the time the matter was 
heard. But even if they had received notice and all been 
in the court they would not have raised any objection 
to the distribution of the legal title to defendant because 
that would be the very thing that plaintiffs as well as 
defendant would want done. 
It is submitted that the issues which are presented 
to the Court by this case, ·which deal entirely with the 
equitable title to the property, in seeking to ha-Ye the 
court impose and enforce a trust were outside the pur-
vie"· of the probate proceeding. See JfcContb Y. Friuk, 
149 U. S. (}:2D, 37 L. Ed. S7G. "\Yherein the court, in holding 
the doctrine of re~ judicata is applicable as to only those 
matters "·hich are in issue in the case. discusses the in-
applicabilit~· of a judg1nent in an action at law to an 
action in equit~·. 
r:l1his ea~c i~ one in equit~· to iinpose and enforce a 
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trust upon property the legal title to which is unquestion-
ably in defendant not only by reason of the probate de-
cree but also the deeds given by plaintiffs. It is submitted 
this case does not represent a collateral attack on the 
decree of the probate court, since its purpose is in no 
way designed to interfere with that decree. 
In two recent Utah cases, this Court has imposed 
a trust upon property the legal title to which has passed 
through probate proceedings. These are: Peterson v. 
Peterson, 105 Utah 133, 141 P. 2d 882, and Haws v. Jen-
sen, 116 Utah 225, 209 Pac. 2d 235. 
The latter case involved a mother who conveyed 
property to her daughter in fee, orally expressing the 
intention that the daughter should hold it for all of the 
mother's heirs. The mother died and then the daughter 
died. The daughter's husband probated the daughter's 
estate and obtained a decree of distribution to himself. 
The other heirs of the mother sued the distributee to im-
pose a trust on the property, the legal title to which he 
had acquired through the probate decree. This Court 
imposed a trust saying: 
"*** But the plaintiffs urge that since the 
probate division of the court had decreed legal 
title to the entire property to be in the defendant, 
the subsequent decree made by the court below 
was necessary to nullify the original decree. In 
order that the defendant's interest in the property 
be protected, the lower court's decree ordering the 
defendant to convey the property to Verba Haws 
who should hold the property as trustee for the 
use and benefit of the heirs at law of Mrs. Haws 
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heir]." 
Defendant cites several cases to support his position, 
most of which are not in point in that they did not involve 
trusts, so the distinction between the effect of the judg-
ment or decree upon the equitable title is not involved. 
The only case cited by defendant which involves a 
trust is Weyant v. Utah Savings & Trust Company, 54 
Utah 818, 182 Pac. 189, and in that case the court imposed 
a trust upon the property which the probate court had 
distributed, and it therefore lends support to the position 
of plaintiffs rather than defendant. 
The case of Edson v. Bartow, 154 N.Y. 199, 48 N. 
E. 541, 61 Am. St. Rep. 609 was one in which a judgment 
in an action to construe a will determining that bequests 
to the executors vested in them, as individuals, absolute 
ownership of property unaffected by any trust was held 
not to bar an action against the individual executors 
seeking to impress upon the property in their hands, as 
legatees, a trust for the benefit of the next of kin by vir-
tue of circumstances extrinsic to the will. 
The case of Meade v. Vande v·orrde, 139 Neb. 827, 
299 N. W. 175, held that a timely action in equity by heirs 
to declare a trust on personal property still in possession 
of the ad1ninistrator, ·who at a grossly inadequate price 
sold same to hin1self at his own sale without notice to the 
heirs is proper}~~ brought even though the ad1ninistrator's 
final arrount wa~ approved b~~ the court and no appeal 
wn~ taken. 
Stratrs v. Dimotsis, CCA 5th, 1940, 110 F. 2d 3i4:, 
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cert. den. 311 U.S. 666, was a case in which property was 
sold by an administrator, who then proceeded to close 
the estate and then bought the property. A judgment for 
the heirs to impress a trust on the property was affirmed. 
The court found no merit in a contention that the pro-
ceedings constituted a collateral attack on the judgment 
and orders of the probate court, and pointed out that the 
action was not to attack the orders and judgment of the 
probate court, or to set aside or invalidate the sale made 
under its authority, but to impress a trust upon the pro-
perty. 
Defendant having promised to hold the claims in 
trust, and having given no indication to plaintiffs that he 
was doing otherwise prior to June of 1954 gives answer 
to appellant's arguments that plaintiff's should have 
appeared to object to the decree of distribution. Until 
such time as they were made aware of defendant's con-
tention that he held both the legal and equitable title, 
there was no reason for them to attempt any action. 
CROSS APPEAL 
POINT ONE 
'THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REQUIRE DE-
FENDANT 1TO ACCOUNT TO PLAINTIFFS FOR THEIR 
SHARE OF THE SUM OF $6,273.93 BEING THE DIFFER_ 
ENCE BETWEEN $13,603.61 ROYALTIES ACCRUED UN-
DER VARIOUS LEASES MADE BY DEFENDANT IN 1949 
AND 1950 AND $7,329.71 'THE AMOUNT SHOWN TO HAVE 
BEEN DEPOSITED IN BANK ACCOUNTS BY DEFENDANT. 
Defendant is accountable for all royalties payable 
in the absence of proof that with the exercise of due 
diligence the same would not be collectible. 
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The Court in Finding of Fact No. 10 found as fol-
lows: 
"10. These Lessees produced and sold ores 
from the Camp Bird Mining Claims during 1949 
and 1950, and Defendant received and deposited 
in special bank accounts the sum of $7,329.71 from 
this production. The royalties which accrued un-
der these shipments and those of Continental 
Mining & Milling Company, as hereinafter set out, 
amounted to $13,603.64. The evidence does not 
support a finding that Defendant actually re-
ceived more than the $7,329. 71. Defendant did not 
obtain any accountings from any of the lessees nor 
take any steps to attempt the collection of any 
other royalties than those paid to him nor to 
verify the amount of royalties due." 
2 Scott on Trusts, paragraph 177 sets forth the fol-
lowing propositions of law: 
"177. Duty to enforce claims. A trustee is un-
der a duty to the beneficiaries to take reasonable 
steps to realize on claims which he holds in trust. 
If he fails to take such steps as are reasonable 
he is subject to a surcharge for such loss as re-
sults from his failure to act* "' "' The trustee i~ 
subject to a surcharge where he fails to take pro-
per steps to collect rent due from a tenant."' "' "' 
If a debtor fails to pay a debt due to the 
estate, it is ordinarily the duty of the trustee to 
bring an action to enforce payn1ent. * * "' If the 
trustee has made no effort to collect the claim. 
however, the burden is upon him to show that 
such effort would have been unavailing.·· 
In addition, interest thereon should be awarded. 
2 Scott on Tntsts, paragraph 207. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
45 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REQUIRE DE-
FENDANT 'TO ACCOUNT TO PLAINTIFFS FOR THEIR 
SHARE OF THE SUM OF $6,560.23 BEING THE PROFIT 
RECEIVED BY DEFENDANT ON A LEASE FROM CON-
TINENTAL MINING AND MILLING COMPANY ANDjOR 
CONSOLIDATED URANIUM MINES, INC. IN 1950. 
The obtaining of the sublease from Continental 
~lining & ~Iilling Co. and/or Consolidated Uranium 
~Iines, Inc. amounted to self dealing by defendant as 
trustee with the trust property. 
Finding of Fact No. 29 is as follows: 
"29. Defendant obtained a lease of certain of 
the Camp Bird mining claims from Continental 
Mining and Milling Company andjor Consolidated 
Uranium Mines, Inc., and mined the same during 
1950. Under said lease Defendant received the 
sum of $23,804.40 for ores produced therefron1 
and incurred expenses in producing said ore'S 
amounting to $17,244.17." 
:2 Scott on Trusts, Sec. 203 provides in part as fol-
lows: 
"A trustee who makes a profit through a 
breach of trust is accountable to the beneficiaries 
for the profit. Even though the profit is not made 
through a breach of trust, however, the trustee is 
accountable for it if it was made in the adminis-
tration of the trust. Thus where a trustee de-
posits trust funds in a bank and receives interest 
on the deposit, he is accountable for the interest 
received even though he was not under a duty 
to make the money productive. The trustee is 
accountable for any profit 1nade on the purchase 
and sale of trust securities or for any profjt 
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made through the use of the trust property, 
whether he uses it himself or receives payment 
from a third person for the privilege of using 
it. Similarly, if he receives a commission or bonm; 
he is accountable for it even if he does not com-
mit a breach of trust in receiving it.'' 
Respondents contend that this profit derived from 
the mining of the Camp Bird Claim No. 12, during 1950, 
while defendant was acting as trustee of the mining 
claims, should be included in defendant's accounting. 
When the opportunity arose for obtaining a sublease 
of the mining claim, it was defendant's duty as trustee 
to obtain this sublease for and on behalf of the bene-
ficiaries of the trust, and he is therefore accountable for 
the profit derived therefrom. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAINTIFFS 
TWELVE TWENTY-FIRS'TS INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY 
AND MONEY AS TO WHICH DEFENDANT WAS REQUIRED 
TO ACCOUNT RATHER THAN THREE-FOURTHS IN'TER-
EST. 
'Vhen defendant obtained the deeds frmn plaintiffs, 
he declared that he would hold the property thereby ac-
quired in trust for the heirs of A. L. Tomlinson in equal 
shares (T-1, pgs. 1-t 30, 31. +±. -±7). There were in all 
eight heir~. so that each would be entitled to one-eighth 
interest. Plaintiffs constitute six of the heirs. and should 
therefore be entitled to three-fourths interest. The Court 
nwarded the1n a twPlYe twt>nty-firsts interest. 
Throughout the Tmnlinson dealings this equal divi-
sion had been the arrange1nent which all of the parties 
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had agreed to. In making the distribution of the estate 
monies, defendant distributed the monies equally among 
all of the heirs, and he testified that the agreement of 
the parties had been that the division was to be equal 
among all the heirs (T-1, p. 286). 
The testimony of plaintiffs, supported as it is by 
the conduct of the parties in handling the estate affairs 
on an equal basis among all the heirs, is indicative that 
the trust was for each heir to have an equal share, and 
the trial court should have made the award consistent 
with this agreement. 
POINT FOUR 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT A 
CREDI'T ON HIS ACCOUNTING FOR THE SUM OF $525.00 
PAID TO K. K. STEFFENSON AND THE SUM OF $200.00 
PAID TO C. ALLEN ELGGREN, BOTH FOR ATTORNEYS' 
FEES. 
Continental Mining and Milling Company agreed 
to pay 'an of defendant's expenses in connection with 
legal work for the Estate or claims for legal work assert-
ed against the Estate (P's. E:xh. 0) and defendant made 
no effort to have Continental Mining and Milling Com-
pany pay the same or to obtain reimbursement from 
said Company. 
Finding of Fact No. 17 is as follows : 
"17. There is no evidence sufficient to base 
a finding that Continental Mining and Milling 
·Company paid any royalty monies to defendant 
pursuant to the January 22, 1950 agreement nor 
that they reimbursed him for expenses incurred 
by him in obtaining counsel to handle the affairs 
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of the estate or establishing title to the Camp 
Bird Mining Claims. Defendant incurred expenses 
in the amount of $525.00 to K. K. Steffenson in 
connection with the title suit and $200.00 to C. 
Allen Elggren, secretary of Continental Mining 
and Milling Company, for handling the probate 
proceedings of the Estate. Defendant made no 
effort to collect any royalties from Continental 
Mining and Milling Company nor to obtain re-
imbursement of the said expenses from that Com-
pany." 
As set forth under POINT ONE a surcharge should 
be made against a trustee who fails to take such steps 
as are reasonable to realize on claim. 2 8 cott on Trusts, 
paragraph 207. 
It is noteworthy that ·C. Allen Elggren, to whom 
$200.00 was paid was Secretary of the company which 
had agreed to furnish the legal fees, and defendant 
should have refrained from paying him in accordance 
with the Continental agreement, Plaintiff's Exhibit 0. 
CONCLUSION 
Much of this brief has been devoted to the conten-
tions argued by appellant relative to a constructive trust. 
It is emphasized however, that the Trial Court found on 
the evidence adduced at the hearing that in receiving both 
the 1950 and 195:2 deeds defendant agreed to hold the 
Inining propert~T for plaintiffs' use and benefit, and that 
defendant holds the properties under an express trust. 
This finding was supported by the evidence and should 
be affirmed. 
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The considerations of whether or not the facts would 
support the imposition of a constructive trust for plain-
tiff's use and benefit due to the unfairness of the trans-
action and the non-disclosure and misrepresentation of 
material facts by defendant is therefore largely of aca-
demic importance in this case. If the trial court's finding 
of an express trust is correct, and we submit it is, there 
is no need to further consider the question of whether 
or not the facts would warrant the imposition of a con-
structive trust in the absence of such an express promise. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEPHENS, BRAYTON & LOWE and 
THOMAS C. CUTHBERT 
Attorneys for Respondents 
1001 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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